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Abstract
Problems of logical theory choice are current being widely dis-
cussed in the context of anti-exceptionalist views on logic. According
to those views, logic is not a special science among others, so, in
particular, the methodology for theory choice should be the same in
logic as for other scientific disciplines. Richard Routley advanced one
such methodology which meshes well with anti-exceptionalism, and
argued that it leads one to choosing one single logic, which is a kind
of ultralogic. We argue that the choice for only one correct system
of logic may be rejected on the basis of the methodology proposed
by Routley and, furthermore, that taking anti-exceptionalism about
logic seriously recommends that a pluralist view of logic should be
accepted. We call this view “full-blooded anti-exceptionalism”, and
the resulting view on logic, lacking a proper name, “local pluralism”.
Keywords: logic; anti-exceptionalism; theory choice; Richard Routley; ul-
tralogic; pluralism.
1 Introduction
Disputes in logic are commonplace: given the variety of systems of logic
available, it seems that one should be able to somehow choose one of those
systems as correct, or at least as the best system available in the meantime;
also, if it is thought that more than one of them is to be deemed correct, then
reasons should be provided for that belief. Anyhow, even pluralists - those
admitting that more than one system of logic may be correct, in some sense
- regard it as implausible that just any system of logic whatever may do the
job in any occasion. So, whatever the persuasion on the number of correct
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logics, there is an important issue involved in choosing the most appropriate
logic, once an application or a goal is set.
How is that choice to be made? There is a growing tendency to think that
logic is not a special science among others, that is, that it has no privileged
place as an a priori science. That implies, among other things, that logic has
not special right to claim that it is known by reason alone, and whose choice
may be justified in a similar a priori vein, independently of anything else.
Rather, a view called anti-exceptionalism about logic is gaining currency,
a view according to which logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous
with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a
priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and
if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories.
(Hjortland 2017, p.632)
Of course, the most imminent precursor of the view is none other than
Quine, with his claim that logic is just another part of the web of belief, one
that is not immune to revision in face of recalcitrant experience. As it is
known, despite this apparently liberal view on logic, Quine was not willing
to give up classical logic, which, he thought, was the underlying logic that
should be used to ground current science (when appropriately regimented).
Assuming the whole anti-exceptionalist package about logic requires that
one provide an account for a wide range of issues, going from how logical
knowledge is obtained, what is the status of such knowledge, and - a topic
discussed by Routley in a way that clearly anticipates current discussion -
how logical theories are rationally chosen. Indeed, if logic is just another
science among others, with no special justification that differs from other
sciences (especially empirical sciences), there is the open possibility to revise
logic. Once one thinks that logic may change in the face of evidence, and
given that there may be more than one candidate for being the new system
to replace the old one, then there must be something to be said about logical
theory choice. In an anti-exceptionalist setting, this account of theory choice,
of course, must not differ substantially from theory revision and theory choice
in other fields of science, in particular, it should be similar to theory choice
in empirical sciences.
As we mentioned, Routley (1980) provided for one such methodology of
theory choice, and claimed that as a result of application of such method, it is
more reasonable to adopt a form of ultralogic. Basically, the idea is that the
methodology is just the same for logic as in other fields of science, as well as in
metaphysics: it requires, in a nutshell, that we balance the virtues and vices
of each option contending to be the true logic and somehow weight them.
Those having lower costs and more benefits are the winners. In order to deal
with the complexity of reasoning in natural language, Routley proposes that
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a kind of ultralogic should be chosen: “the best choice of logical foundations
is an ultralogic, that is, an intensional inexistential logic which is ultramodal
(i.e. goes far beyond the modal), is paraconsistent, and is suitably relevant”
(Routley (1980) p. 97, italics in the original; see also Routley (1980a) for
further articulation).
In this paper, we propose that bringing logic closer to empirical science,
as the anti-exceptionalist does, may be seen as an obstacle to the ultralogic
project. In fact, it may be seen as an obstacle to attempts to provide for
the choice of one, and only one, true logic. Monism about logic may be
threatened. We shall argue that the proximity with science adopted by the
anti-exceptionalist benefits, at least in the current stage of science, a localist
and pluralist approach: logic, just as any other empirical science, should deal
locally with its problems, with distinct situations requiring distinct logics.
Here, to consider applications relative to “distinct situations” involves even
the standard application of logic to deductive inferences: that is, even when
it comes to use logic in the evaluation of arguments, situations may appear
that require distinct logics for the proper study of the relevant cases. In fact,
the idea that there is one all-embracing system of logic that encompasses
everything would be rather atypical when compared with the situation in
other branches of science. The pluralist has the advantages when proximity
with science is taken seriously: distinct logics are acceptable, depending on
ones’ goals and on ones’ targets (recall, even when it comes to evaluate
arguments). Even if the goal is to study valid inferences in natural language,
anti-exceptionalism seems to benefit the idea that there are many logics that
should do the job. We shall make this point clearer in due time.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we sketch the model
for logical choice, as advanced by Routley (1980), and more recently by Priest
(2006; 2016). In section 3 we discuss two key features of the model: ade-
quacy to the data and scope. We argue that satisfaction of these conditions
by no means entails, as Routley seems to suggest, that there is one true logic,
which is a kind of ultralogic. Rather, there are many difficulties with them
in the light of Routley’s model of theory choice. In section 4 we advance our
own solution to the relation of logic to the criteria of scope and adequacy.
We argue that once the similarity of logic and other scientific disciplines is
properly understood, a more local, piecemeal, approach to logic is recom-
mended, and local pluralism is a more reasonable position. We present our
conclusions in section 5.
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2 A model for theory choice
Let us start by getting clear as to what is at stake when one is speaking
about the choice of a logical theory. It is clear that mathematically, there
is a huge variety of logical systems available. As objects of mathematical
study, perhaps each one deserves attention as any other, with no issue as to
which is right, or which should be rationally chosen. This is a kind of pure
systems pluralism. No one would deny that. Also, it is clear that distinct
systems of logic may be applied in a wide array of applications, as classical
propositional logic may be used in the study of electrical circuits, and some
paraconsistent systems of logic may be used in the development of databases,
or perhaps in software for the control of traffic lights. This may be called
applied logical pluralism, and it is also fairly non-controversial.
However, it is not this kind of multiplicity of applications that is typi-
cally under discussion when it comes to logical choice (although the model
of logical choice to be presented could well be applied in these cases too).
Rather, it is to the so-called canonical application that philosophers shift
their attention, to the case of providing for a logical theory that accounts for
valid inferences and the notions related to the characterization of validity,
such as truth, conditional, and meaning (among others).
Here we shall be concerned only with the problem of canonical applica-
tion, so that logic should be understood as applied to the study of inferences.
As Priest (2016), p.39 puts it:
The central notion of logic is validity, and its behaviour is the
main concern of logical theories. Giving an account of validity
requires giving accounts of other notions, such as negation and
conditionals. Moreover, a decent logical theory is no mere laundry
list of which inferences are valid/invalid, but also provides an
explanation of these facts. An explanation is liable to bring in
other concepts, such as truth and meaning. A fully-fledged logical
theory is therefore an ambitious project.
It is to a study of valid inference, as it appears in natural languages and com-
mon situations involving argumentation, that logic, understood according to
the canonical application, applies. The dispute concerns which system better
systematizes those inferences, and which provides for a better explanation
of them (we assume, with Priest (2016) p.39, that providing for a system
of logic involves also specifying an intended semantics appropriate for that
system, so that even if a system S1 is formally a subsystem of S2, their in-
tended semantics may distinguish them; this is clearly the case for classical
and intuitionistic logics, for instance).
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.6
366
The anti-exceptionalist believes that disputes concerning this issue should
be resolved as any other dispute concerning theory choice in science, and,
perhaps, as we typically seem to solve practical issues concerning choice in
everyday life. In fact, Routley goes as far as to put theory choice in logic in
the same level as other simple kinds of choice in daily life:
Choice of a logical theory is a special case of the choice of a
theory or a system, and choice of these does not differ in principle
from choice of such diverse items as a new house, a winner (e.g.
of a gymnastics or equestrian contest), or of a recording of a
symphony. (Routley 1980, p.81)
As it is understood by the anti-exceptionalists, (at least by Routley (1980),
Priest (2016) and Hjortland (2017), see also Russell (2014)), theory choice
involves a kind of abductive argument, which results from the evaluation of
the merits of the diverse theories on a list of desiderata that should be met
by theories in the field under investigation. Empirical theories, for instance,
should fare well in empirical adequacy, fruitfulness, simplicity, non-adhocness,
mathematical tractability (when the theory is mathematized), and so on. For
other kinds of theories or situations involving choice, other factors could have
further importance.
So, while the general procedure for choice is the same in every case, what
is different in different case studies are the factors that must be taken into
account. Logic requires that some special factors are taken into account,
factors that, for instance, would not be taken into account when choosing a
record of a symphony or a new house. Routley (1980) sect. 2 lists among
the important factors or criteria to be taken into account in logical choice
the following ones:
i) Extensive scope: logic should have universal applicability, not only as
a foundation of extensional mathematics, but working also for other very
dissimilar fields such as linguistics and philosophy;
ii) Conformity to the facts : there may be some (few, perhaps) logical facts
which a theory should account for; Routley provides for some instances: a
conditional should count as false when its antecedent is true and its conse-
quent is false; set inclusion is transitive (for further facts that are relevant
for our discussion of Routley’s views, see the text ahead). Any theory failing
to account for such facts should not be taken seriously as contenders in the
dispute for the correct logical theory.
iii) Accountability of the data: Routley distinguishes theory dependent
data from facts. As an example of theory dependent data that must be ac-
counted for, are the linguistic data, as well as, more controversially, Russell’s
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set (the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves), which is deemed as
a data of set theory. As a result, it should figure in any account of set the-
ory; contenders failing to take it into account, such as Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory are also out of the game, while others, such as von Neumann-Bernays-
Go¨del theory, account for it as a proper class, which deems the treatment
excessively artificial, and, thus, inappropriate too (according to Routley, at
least).
Other criteria involved in theory choice include systematization, simplic-
ity, fruitfulness, explanatory power, among others famous from discussions
in philosophy of science (Priest (2016) also lists such virtues, while not dis-
tinguishing facts from data; the distinction is, of course, problematic, and
we shall comment it further in section 4).
Once a list of criteria for theory evaluation is specified, the model proceeds
as follows (here we present the model advanced by Priest (2016), given that
his exposition is very similar to the one advanced by Routley, and that the
details of the model are of less importance, but rather the same background
idea seems to be working in each proposal; see also Priest (2006) chap.8).
Suppose we are given the list of factors that must be taken into account in
logical theory choice:
c1, c2, c3, . . . cn
Given a logical theory T , we may attribute for each ci a score according to a
scale ranging, say, in the real numbers from -10 to 10 (the choice of a range
is rather arbitrary, of course), according to a measure function m. So, the
value T receives for ci is m(ci). Suppose, for instance, that a system of logic
has a conjunction that fails to be true when both of its conjuncts are true.
One could think that it fails badly in accounting for the facts, and, supposing
that ci represents adequacy to the facts, would like to represent the fact that
it does really bad in accounting for the facts by attributing m(ci) = −8.
But evaluating how each system fares according to each criterion is not
all. The distinct criteria ci may also differ on the weight or importance
attributed to them. Adequacy to the facts is of utmost importance: a logic
failing to account for the facts is surely not a serious contender. Simplicity,
on the other hand, is a rather ambiguous criterion, which may prevent that
important changes are made in the system when further evidence appears,
so that it may be deemed less important, say, than explanatory power (in
general, there is a balance to be achieved between keeping the system simple,
and accounting for more evidence).
This difference in the relevance of each criterion is reflected in the model
by attributing each criterion ci a weight wi, which is taken into account in
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the evaluation. In the end, once every criterion receives a weight and a value
according to the measure m, we have what Priest (2016) calls a rationality
index for theories, a weighted sum of each of the criteria:
p(T ) = m(c1)w1 + m(c2)w2 + . . . + m(cn)wn
The theory that fares better on such a computation is to be preferred. Of
course, as Priest (2016) is the first to recognize, the model is simplistic and
it is not intended to capture an actual practice of theory choice. It merely
attempts to capture the informal dialectic that is involved in theory choice
situations. As we have mentioned, the details of the model are less relevant
than the general idea that some criteria are weighted and compared, and that
some are more important than others. Furthermore, the model in itself is
neutral as to which should be preferred, monism or pluralism about logic (see
Priest (2016) p.41). As we shall see, Routley (among others) employs it to
support a form of monism, but that is due to further considerations adduced
to the model, not because of the nature of the model of theory choice.
Here we shall take it for granted that this kind of approach may be seen as
common to theory choice across different sciences, and even in daily life mat-
ters. We shall focus our discussion in the idea that, once logic is thought to
be one only among other sciences (one of the tenets of the anti-exceptionalist
thesis), the idea that scope is to be given preference loses weight, as well as
the conclusion reached by Routley (and Priest, among others) that classical
logic is wrong, and that a non-classical logic should be preferred. In fact, a
localist pluralism will emerge as the most plausible option. Roughly put, a
localist pluralist holds that distinct logics may be appropriate to deal with
distinct situations, even when the application involves the study of valid in-
ferences. The monist, of course, holds that one system of logic is correct for
all situations where one is concerned with validity and inferences.
Before going ahead, let us mention that Routley (1980) sect. 4 lists further
“facts” that should be accounted for. These facts are taken for granted, and
provide, according to Routley, for evidence that classical logic, in particular,
is ruled out as an inadequate candidate in the dispute concerning the correct
logical theory:
Fact 1) Much of our discourse is intensional (while classical logic is ex-
tensional).
Fact 2) Much of philosophical discourse is about the non-existent.
Fact 3) There are inconsistent non-trivial theories and inconsistent non-
trivial situations (while classical logic is explosive in the face of inconsis-
tency).
Given that classical logic is unable to account for those facts, or at least
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not with without much distortion and trickery, leads Routley to declare that
classical logic fails in providing for the basic requisite of accounting for the
facts. It is as if an empirical theory provided for wrong empirical predictions.
The logical system chosen by Routley to do the job is a kind of ultralogic
that takes into account all the relevant features of natural language and of
logic as a universal foundation for a wide range of inquiries. In fact, Routley
did not develop such a logic in all its details (see Routley (1980a)), but the
idea seems very close to the current logical monists, those defending that
there is only one true logic that accounts for all the important facts about
the consequence relation when the canonical application is taken into account
(see Priest (2006) chap.12 and Read (2006) for further defenses of versions
of monism).
What lies behind the demand that one system should account for those
facts is the idea that logic should account for the whole variety of inferences
and features of natural language (so, scope is also highly valued). We now
consider the claim that as a result of those requirements, one should choose
a kind of ultralogic as a universal logic.
3 Adequacy and scope
Monism about logic, or about the canonical application of it, at least, seems
to be a pretty reasonable position on a first sight: there is one set of phe-
nomena, argumentation and (deductive) inference in natural language, and
there are facts and data about it that a logical theory should get right. There
simply cannot be many correct theories about it, given that those theories
disagree on which inferences are valid (see Priest (2006) chap.12 for further
discussion about monism and pluralism). While it is contentious which the-
ory has indeed got it right, for the monist there can be no discussion about
the fact that there is a single correct description about consequence.
That may be a simplistic description of the underlying motivation of the
monist, but we hope it is not an excessively unfair description of the idea
guiding the monist enterprise. As we have seen, Routley seems to be guided
by one such idea when proposing that logic should have the broadest scope
as possible (and he goes on and quotes none other than Kant to support such
a view! See Routley 1980 p.83). In fact, people reason under a wide array
of conditions or situations, where modal notions appear, where inconsistent
concepts are constantly employed (consciously or unconsciously), where sit-
uations encompassing indeterminacy of truth values are plenty, where talk
about non-existent, fictitious entities is common, and so on. Those seem to
be part of the data and, as Routley has put, those most varied cases furnish
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some of the data for logic.
Given the above model on logical theory choice, where adequacy to the
data and to the facts is highly valued, and where scope is also valued, a
system of logic accounting for all those features is to be praised as a more
reasonable choice than systems that cannot account for such features. In fact,
failing to account for those features is a reason for one to discard classical
logic, among others, as a reasonable candidate. At least, Routley seems to
believe so.
So far, no such ultralogic that is an “intensional inexistential logic which
is ultramodal (i.e. goes far beyond the modal), is paraconsistent, and is
suitably relevant” (Routley (1980) p. 97) was completely developed. Rout-
ley outlined the requirements and ideas behind the project, but it was not
fully developed. In fact, the basic suggestion was that such a system of logic
would indeed be rather weak (in order to be very general, encompassing the
most diverse kinds of situations), allowing for a lot of context-sensitivity in
permitting one to somehow obtain features of distinct systems in distinct
situations (see Routley (1980a)). In situations that are complete and consis-
tent, ultralogic should recover classical logic. In incomplete consistent cases,
it should recover some kind of paracomplete logic (a logic violating a version
of the excluded middle). In cases that involve contradictions (such as when
dealing with semantic paradoxes, Cantorian set theory), a certain dialetheic
paraconsistent logic should be recovered. And so on. So, the suggestion
brings together the existence of only one correct system of logic, and also the
idea that distinct contexts may force such logic having a definite, more nar-
rowly defined, shape. That would be the optimal system on what concerns
adequacy to the facts and the data, as well as to the scope. None other could
compete with that, not even Priest’s LP, it seems.
In particular, in replacing a dominant system by a new system, espe-
cially if the new system is non-classical, it is advisable that the new system
preserves the sphere of application of the old system where it did succeed.
Routley (1980) p.95 advises that one should be able
to provide a place (preferably a comfortable place) for what is
superseded. It is good, common, logical sense - especially where
so much is unknown, as is the position with nonclassical theories,
in particular nonclassical theories which do not simply include the
classical - to be able to allow that classical theory succeeds for
a very significant class of cases (of course it succeeds where it
succeeds, which is in all classical situations, and indeed for many
ordinary cases (e.g. everyday finite consistent situations).
Of course, in the context of a ultralogic such strategy is generalized, so
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that inconsistent situations have their place, consistent classical situation
have theirs (where classical logic holds), incomplete situations have a place
too, and so on. Given the ultralogic, one should be able to plug the features
of the context required and obtain the corresponding inferences, as a special
case of the general logic. This would be similar to obtaining Newtonian
mechanics as a special case of relativistic mechanics, when certain conditions
are met.
However, what is seen as a most praised virtue of a universal system of
logic (its wide scope and adequacy) is in fact a problem, which, we shall
argue, makes pluralistic localism more plausible.
The first problem with this strategy of re-gaining distinct systems from a
universal system, depending on the kind of context under study, is basically
equivalent to the local pluralism defended, for instance, by da Costa (1997)
and also by Bueno (2010). Consider the Principle of Adequacy, stated by
da Costa (1997) p.55, which consists roughly in the claim that one ought
to choose the most adequate logic for any given context. Here, a context
is understood by da Costa as a scientific theory, but one could broaden the
scope to encompass conversational situations, or fragments of dialogue where
deductive reasoning is employed. What then is the difference between the
local pluralist, which will choose the logic that best suits a context, from
the universalist, that somehow recaptures a most adequate system inside her
universal system? It seems that the difference is merely verbal, and so, both
positions could handle the same cases with the same strategies. In fact, the
universalist seems to be in a more delicate position of having to be able to
show that the required local system is indeed a particular case of her general
posited system, something that may not be possible to do, depending on the
features of the universal system chosen and of the local system demanded.
But here Routley could have an answer. In fact, he is against such a
“geographical” view of logic, with borders so well defined, where each system
finds an application. The local pluralist seems to be worst off, it could be said,
because the position ends up requiring that we should be able to separate
specific situations where each system of logic would apply (this argument
is also presented by Priest (2006)). However, notice that this objection, if
it works, backfires on the monist: given that there are no clear borders of
application of distinct systems of logic, how would it be possible to find a well-
defined place, for instance, for classical logic? Well, even for the universalist
the borders must be well defined, if a kind of recapture in distinct situations
is to work.
The main worry behind the geographical complaint is that one may wish
to reason in borderline situations. For instance, a situation involving incom-
plete cases (where there are, perhaps, truth value gaps), and where there are
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inconsistencies. Both kinds of cases must be taken into account. Given that
the universalist will be able to account for that, the local pluralist will be
able to do that too: just use the same system that the universalist, but now
considered as accounting for the situation in question. That is, consider the
new domain as a newly specified region to be accounted for. Geographical
borders may change. Again, there are no major differences between both
approaches; every time a universalist may find a system that recovers some
features of a specific situation, the localist will be able to do that too.
But the positions are not equivalent on all counts. It seems the univer-
salist monist is positing a universal background logic that must account for
each specific situation, but which is idle when it comes to real application:
in fact, in every situation requiring logical treatment, there are always some
constraints that are holding, and the full universal logic never does any spe-
cific job. In this sense, the universal scope is illusory, and the localist has
the benefits of economy. We shall also argue in the next section that the
localist is in fact more fine-tuned with current scientific practice, and if we
are going to embrace a legitimate anti-exceptionalism about logic, localism
is preferable to the universal approach to logic as espoused by Routley and
other monists.
Talk about adequacy (the most praised of the criteria) is also problematic
for a universalist or monist. In fact, the idea is that one should prefer a system
that is able to account for all the features of language and inferences, which,
as we listed before, are widely varied. Also, recall that in order to do that,
one should plug to the universal underlying logic the situations being treated
(despite the geographical complaint), and recover the appropriate logical
system. However, there are clear concerns on whether the kind of recovery
strategy that must be employed in these cases really is able to keep faithful
to the data. We shall argue that there are obstacles to the straightforward
claim that a universal logic accounts for the data.
Perhaps, the most discussed case of recapture in the literature consists of
the recapture of classical logic inside paraconsistent systems. For a specific
case, consider paraconsistent logics such as Priest’s LP, which is a candi-
date for the correct logic according to some. While (informally) it is able
to account for inconsistent situations, it has many difficulties in express-
ing consistent situations. Truth is always compatible with falsity, so that
when reasoning with consistent situations, where a true sentence is typically
thought to be ““just true”, one is at a loss. There are no simple ways to do
that (to introduce a special predicate J for “just true”, for instance, won’t
work; see Scharp (2018)). One of the strategies to recover classical logic in
those contexts is Beall’s shrieking rules (Beall (2013)). Basically (we are
simplifying), the idea consists in adding to each consistent predicate P (or
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even for each theory T) a shrieked version !P which says that statements in-
volving P are either consistent or trivial; this would emulate the behavior of
a classical situation, incompatible with true contradictions (we follow Scharp
(2018) in the notation; for details, see Beall (2013) and Scharp (2018)).
Now, although shrieked predicates seem to emulate the behavior of pred-
icates in classical situations, the result looks really bad when it comes to
judge on the adequacy to the data of the resulting system. As Scharp (2018)
convincingly argues, we run the risk of misrepresenting any debate between
a dialetheist and a classical logician. Adapting an example by Scharp, con-
sider a dialetheist who claims that “it is true and false that Socrates is in the
room”. Now, consider a classical logician disputing that claim, who uses the
predicate in a consistent manner, claiming that “it is true that Socrates is in
the room (with the possibility of it being also false ruled out)”. According
to the shrieking strategy, the classicist is really claiming that the predicate
“to be in the room”, when applied to Socrates, is consistent or trivial. In
the end, this is another predicate, not the one that was in the discussion to
begin with. That is, after going through a shrieking process, the original
predicate changes in order to include the required clause for avoiding the
possibility of a true contradiction. The classical logician, however, still uses
the predicate in a consistent, non-shrieked manner, so that after the shriek-
ing process the classical logician and the dialetheist will no longer be talking
about the same predicate; the contenders may be talking past each other.
Worst yet: a shrieking version of every predicate of the language which may
be subject of consistent discourse must be introduced if we are to account
for consistent talk using those predicates. In the end, there is a complete
revision of predicates of natural language. That is clearly the kind of result
that one would expect from those willing to capture the facts, to correctly
describe the data; indeed, it requires some reforming of natural language.
This same kind of complaint may be present in other kinds of recapture
strategies. Whenever a given situation is stipulated, in order for the sentences
of the universal language to be confined to that situation, a kind of recapture
strategy must be employed, a strategy that will end up distorting the very
sentences we began with, failing to account for the data. Nothing wrong
with prescribing a reform of the vernacular, but that is not the goal of the
universalist, or of the monist in general.
As a result of the discussions in this section, we achieved the following
results: although universal scope and adequacy to the data are some of the
points Routley puts more emphasis on, and are those criteria which seem
to boost his proposal of a single ultralogic (and as a result, of the idea
that a unique system must be chosen), there are problems with satisfying
both of the criteria. Universal scope still requires that one treats specific
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.6
374
situations piecemeal, so that the position does not distinguish itself from
a local pluralism. Furthermore, local pluralism is more economic, in not
positing idle universal structure acting on the background. Adequacy to the
data is also difficult to grant due to the kind of distortion introduced by
recapture strategies. In particular, monists seem to concede that consistent
situations are part of life too, and that they must be recovered in their
favorite logic. Doing that requires that some approach to obtain classical
inferences be presented, and we have suggested, following Scharp (2018) that
such approaches will fail to keep in touch with the initial data. Some working
on the form of the sentences of natural language will have to be made, and
this provides for incongruences with the original data.
4 Going completely anti-exceptional
But once the proposal for a universal ultralogic seems to fail in the terms
of the proposed model of theory choice, what are we supposed to do? How
to account for the data? What are we to make of scope? Our suggestion is
that a kind of local pluralism about logic is advised if one goes completely
anti-exceptionalist (or, at least, if one takes anti-exceptionalism completely
seriously). Our point is that perhaps when logic (under the canonical applica-
tion) is brought even closer to other sciences, then, the difficulties presented
before for a universalist monist picture disappear. In fact, one may better ap-
preciate the virtues of the kind of local pluralism that is presented here. That
means that some of the constraints put by Routley on the most appropriate
system of logic will have to go.
The first problem is that such a universal applicability, or universal scope,
seems to be rather at odds with the piecemeal approach that characterizes
current scientific methodology. While indeed unification is a virtue in science,
unification does not mean that scientists dream of bringing under the same
theoretical apparatus disparate fields as economics and space-time theories.
Indeed, if we examine the tenets of the anti-exceptionalist, the idea that logic
uses the same methodology of science, then, perhaps, the simple claim that
one logic should account for all the phenomena may be seen as fragile, and
so, not in tune with current scientific practice.
In fact, current practice of science is much more local and fragmented
than is generally acknowledged in discussions outside philosophy of science.
As Bueno (2017) p.229 clearly puts the issue, a scientific monist is one who
believes that there is a single domain to which all scientific theories apply. A
pluralist, on the other hand, believes that there is a plurality of scientific
domains, a plurality of scientific theories, and the theories that are well
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succeeded are empirically adequate for their domains. The pluralist seems
to be much better off on the account of current science:
It seems to me that any monist view faces considerable difficulties
to make sense of contemporary science, where there is extremely
little in common among different domains. Just consider how di-
verse the following theories and domains of scientific inquiry are:
quantum field theory and pediatrics, molecular biology and cul-
tural anthropology, biochemistry and sociological social psychol-
ogy. They do not share goals, methods, theories, or approaches.
(Bueno (2017) p.229)
Notice that science is being taken seriously in this case. Our claim will be
that something similar -that is, a form of disunity or pluralism - is manifest
also in the smaller scale, when we confine ourselves to the case of logic; that
is, in applying logic, there is also a variety of kinds of phenomena, even if we
set ourselves the task of studying deductive inferences, and distinct methods
and approaches may be required in order to deal with each kind. Inferences
are used for a wide variety of purposes, in very different contexts, so that
distinct approaches for each of them may be studied.
Of course, one may argue that the phenomenon is only one: inference.
However, even inference comes in variety of kinds that are not as uniform as
usually thought. For the sake of argument, consider the distinction between
inductive and deductive inferences. Both are inferences, but they require
distinct approaches. For deductive logic, consider situations involving plu-
rals: it is known that in some cases, a plural logic may be more appropriate
to capture the idiosyncrasies of arguments involving pluralities, but, at the
same time, such logics cannot deal with deontic reasoning. That is no reason
for one to argue that a deontic plural logic is the correct one, for yet another
kind of phenomenon is still left out (e.g. alethic modality). Our pluralism is
not of the kind that claims that distinct logics may do the same job: rather,
that the approach to reasoning, when that is the chosen application, should
be performed piecemeal, taking into account the salient features of the field
of application and the goals of such study. This also should make clearer
what we mean by the claim that this is a “local” form of pluralism: instead
of claiming that the same field of investigation may be correctly approached
by distinct and incompatible systems, we claim that distinct systems may
be locally more appropriate for distinct tasks. That is, the form of pluralism
defended proposes that even in the case when the object of investigation is
deductive argument, a pluralist approach inside logic may be favored, in the
sense of a division of labor. It is this kind of approach, we claim, that seems
much closer to scientific practice in other fields.
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To favor this view, we begin by pointing to the claim that natural lan-
guage, by itself, does not seem to have a logic of its own. In fact, our claim
is that language is used in many distinct ways, even when argumentation
is the target, in order for us to select it all as a field of study. As Smith
(2011) and Glanzberg (2015) among others have already pointed out, it is
difficult to see natural language as involving a logic, given that logic requires
idealization and, to some degree, sharpening and perhaps even distortion of
some features of the target object of study.
This brings us to an important analogy between science and logic that
is generally not taken into account, even by anti-exceptionalists, and which
will provide for further evidence that the kind of pluralism we have been
advancing is a more promising candidate for a correct understanding of logic,
at least as it is practiced today. To begin with, logic is a mathematical
science. The mathematical aspects of logic are just as well-developed and
just as abstract as any other branch of mathematics (this is discussed in
da Costa (1997)). As we have already discussed, the canonical application
of logic to deductive inference may be considered as privileged over other
applications, such as electrical circuits, but it is an application, nonetheless.
In this sense, discussions of applying logic to inference may benefit from
discussions of applications of mathematics to natural phenomena in general.
We do not have space to discuss all the relevant features of applying
mathematics, and logic in particular, to the study of inference, but we shall
confine ourselves to the one we think will make clearer our claim that natu-
ral language does not have a logic of its own and that the pluralist position
we advanced is the most appropriate. It concerns the role of idealization in
science (again, if we are going to take seriously the anti-exceptionalist claim
that logic is continuous with science, these aspects should bear some simi-
larity). This will also help us deal with the problem of scope and adequacy
to the data, questions we raised in the beginning of this section.
What is the role of idealization in logic? Idealization is involved in at least
two related stages of applying logic: the selection of the data and stipulation
of the target phenomena, and the development of the mathematical systems
that will account for the data and the phenomena.
In the first case, viz. selecting the phenomena, idealization helps us
preparing the data, just as it helps physicists in setting their experiments
and reading the results of those experiments. In the case of logic, as Smith
(2011) has pointed out, one cannot simply select inference or consequence
and then go ahead to apply a mathematical structure to describe it. Rather,
one puts some filters that somehow sharpen the phenomena into workable
units and provides for conditions of the application of mathematical theory.
There are important questions to be answered once inference is settled as the
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field of application, and before the mathematical apparatus may be applied
or developed. There is no raw notion of inference waiting to be captured. To
illustrate the point, both of how one gets at a loss by thinking that there is
one pre-theoretic notion of inference to be captured, and how the sharpening
process may be developed, determining features of a more mathematically
tractable notion of consequence, it is interesting to quote Smith (2011) p.29
(here, he is challenging those who believe that there is a well-defined pre-
theoretical notion of logical consequence):
If you think that there is, start asking yourself questions like this.
Is the intuitive notion of consequence constrained by considera-
tions of relevance? - do ex falso quodlibet inferences commit
a fallacy of relevance? When can you suppress necessarily true
premisses and still have an inference which is intuitively valid?
What about the inference ’The cup contains some water; so it
contains some H2O molecules’? That necessarily preserves truth
(on Kripkean assumptions): but is it valid in the intuitive sense?
- if not, just why not?
Of course, answering those questions provides for features of a consequence
relation that applies in some situations (classical situations, dealing with
classical mathematics, for instance), and answering them differently provides
for relations that apply in other situations. It all depends on the purpose of
the investigation: investigate the consequence relation that seems to be in
the underlying logic of classical mathematics, or in contexts where relevance
is important, or in contexts where there may be undefined truth values?
The data provided by answering those questions sharpen the informal idea
of consequence relation, idealize it, but also permits one to introduce the
mathematical machinery of logic. Without this, as Smith (2011) argued, no
mathematical theory is able to attempt to capture an informal notion. That
accounts clearly for the scope of a system: the scope involves the field that
is delimited in the first place.
Once this is settled, questions about the adequacy of a system to the facts
and to the data get easier to answer. In fact, one could even go on and say
that only after such a round of idealization it is possible to speak of facts to
be described and data. Given a clear (informal) notion of consequence, one
may check which system of logic better captures the relevant features of the
informal idea. Notice that this is completely in agreement with the kind of
pluralism we have provided for. Given that the notion of consequence may
be specified in distinct directions, for distinct purposes, involving distinct
relevant choices of logical vocabulary, there may be distinct sets of data once
this first stage is performed, and distinct systems may do better on each.
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The second aspect where idealization gets in is in the development of
the mathematical system itself. As Colyvan (2013) has argued, logic in-
volves idealizations for many distinct purposes, just as scientific theories and
models do. According to the taxonomy advanced by Colyvan (2013), some
idealizations are specific for mathematical tractability, such as perhaps the
truth-table of the material conditional, or the assumption that the truth as-
signment function is, indeed, a function (it could well be a relation). Some
are due to requirements of the field of application, once one is stipulated. So,
for instance, one could argue that a negation sign that explodes in the face of
a contradiction does not account for the data once an inconsistent domain is
chosen, or once one chooses a domain involving explicit assumption of some
contradictions. In this sense, there are some data that get fixed in the first
stage, as we commented, when the sharpening of the informal concept pro-
vided for, and which the system to be developed must account for. Colyvan
also separates for a third kind of idealization, which is called “demands of
reason”. Demands of reason are closer to what Routley called facts, condi-
tions such as the truth of a conjunction whose conjuncts are also true, or
the falsity of a conditional whose antecedent is true and whose consequent is
false. This category, of course, is the most debatable one, but it seems that it
would account for a distinction between basic logical facts, some that cannot
be absent of any logical theory willing to be applied to argumentation, and
those that are more flexible, which fall in the second category of idealization
and may fail in some contexts, but hold in others.
Our main contention is that the specific classification of the kinds of ide-
alization by Colyvan is secondary to the claim that providing for a logical
system to deal with a set of phenomena involves idealization in the mathe-
matical apparatus of the logic. This brings logic closer to science too, given
that mathematical idealizations are present in other branches of science as
well. To demand that a mathematical description account for a wide vari-
ety of disparate phenomena makes for mathematical treatment more difficult
and, perhaps impossible. One must abstract some of the features of the target
domain and idealize less important features. As we have provided for an in-
stance, when dealing with mathematical reasoning, in classical mathematics,
at least, considerations of tense, of the possibility of inconsistency, among
others, may be left out of the account, so that the system gets simpler.
These are common features that are involved in scientific model-building,
and providing for a system of logic may be seen as similar as providing for a
mathematical model of a situation that is given.
Once the target situation and the model are given, one is able to judge on
the adequacy of the model and provide for a kind of bootstrapping process
where the model is judged against the data, and the data are judged against
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the explanatory power of the model. This accounts for the adequacy criteria,
of course, and is not a matter of all or nothing, but of balancing pros and cons
of the model. In fact, the very idea of adequacy may end up being revised
in the light of philosophical discussion of other sciences. There is a huge
literature in the philosophy of science on how we may learn from models we
know are not completely realistic, but we shall not develop that discussion
here. That is a clearly underdeveloped issue in logic, but one that must be
taken into account by anti-exceptionalists, an issue we believe will also help
us better understand the nature of logic and its relation to its applications.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model for theory choice in logic that was advanced by
Routley and located it in current debates on anti-exceptionalism about logic.
By judging the ultralogical proposal of Routley - and implicitly along with it,
typical monist tenets - in the lights of the demands of antiexceptionalism, we
have argued that a universalist proposal is not preferred over a pluralistic ap-
proach. Indeed, we have advanced a story according to which one may bring
logic even closer to other fields of science by taking into account idealization,
abstraction, and a kind of domain sensitivity. According to that story, logic is
even closer to other branches of science than is typically assumed, and there
is a whole field still to be explored, on taking logical theories as models for
specific kinds of phenomena and all the implications such approach may have
(this kind of investigation is put forward also in Shapiro (2006)). We have
called our approach “full blooded anti-exceptionalism” in order to emphasize
that the similarity of logic with science is brought to other dimensions that
are not (so far) typically appreciated by other anti-exceptionalists.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.6
380
References
Beall, J. C. (2013) Shrieking against gluts: a solution to the ‘Just True’
problem. Analysis 73, pp. 438-445.
Bueno, O. (2010) Is logic a priori? The Harvard Review of Philosophy XVII,
pp.105-117.
Colyvan, M (2013) Idealisations in normative models. Synthese 190,
pp.1337-1350.
da Costa, N. C. A. (1997) Logiques Classiques et Non Classiques. Essai sur
les fondements de la logique. Paris: Masson.
Glanzberg, M. (2015) Logical consequence and natural language. In: C. R.
Carret, O. T. Hjortland (eds.) The foundations of logical consequence, pp.
71-120. Oxford: Oxford Un. Press.
Hjortland, O. T. (2017) Anti-exceptionalism about logic. Philosophical stud-
ies 174, pp.631-658.
Priest, G. (2006) Doubt truth to be a liar. Oxford: Oxford Un Press.
Priest, G. (2016) Logical disputes and the a priori. Princ´ıpios v.23, n.40,
pp.29-57.
Read, S. (2006) Monism: The one true logic. In: D. Devidi, T. Kenyon
(eds.) A logical approach to philosophy: essays in honor of Graham Solomon,
pp.193-209. Springer.
Routley, R. (1980) The choice of logical foundations: Non-classical choices
and the ultralogical choice. Studia Logica 39(1), p.77-98.
Routley, R. (1980a) Ultralogic as universal? In: R. Routley, Exploring
Meinong’s jungle and beyond. An investigation of noneism and the theory
of items. Canberra: Departmental Monograph, Philosophy Department, Re-
search School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
Russell, G. (2014) Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic.
Philosophical studies 171(1), pp. 161-175.
Scharp, K. (2018) Shrieking in the face of vengeance, Analysis, anx163,
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx163
Shapiro, S. (2006) Vagueness in context. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, P. (2011) Squeezing arguments. Analysis 71, pp. 22-30.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 3.6
